[30] At the very outset, it is important to
record that there is no challenge by any counsel to the essential findings
of fact made by the trial judge and confirmed by the
summary conviction appeal judge. Also of significance, as
we consider the arguments made to this court, is that many of the most
recent Supreme Court of Canada authorities dealing with claims of aboriginal
rights - principally Adams, Van der Peet,
and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 - were
either not available at trial, or not argued before the courts below.
Constitutional Principles
[31] Interpretation of a constitution
is quite
different from simply construing an ordinary statute. As
Dickson J., as he then was, noted in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (at p. 155):
The task of expounding a constitution
is crucially
different from that of construing a statute.
A statute
defines present rights and obligations.
It is easily
enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution,
by
contrast, is drafted with an eye to the
future. Its
function is to provide a continuing framework
for the
legitimate exercise of governmental power
and, when
joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights,
for the
unremitting protection of individual
rights and
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions
cannot easily be
repealed or amended. It must, therefore,
be capable of
growth and development over time to meet
new social,
political and historical realities often
unimagined by
its framers. The judiciary is the guardian
of the
constitution and must, in interpreting
its provisions,
bear these considerations in mind.
[32] The Constitution should be interpreted "in a large, liberal
and comprehensive spirit." See St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company
v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.).
[http://library.usask.ca/native/cnlc/vol02/541.html]
As noted in Re Section 24 of the B.N.A. Act (Edwards v. The Attorney
General of Canada), [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.):
"The B.N.A. Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth
and expansion within its natural limits" (at pp. 106-107).
[33] Furthermore, the analysis of aboriginal rights must take
place within the constitutional framework established by the Supreme
Court. These decisions set forth the general principles to be
applied when considering the relationships between the Crown and aboriginal
peoples, which are helpfully summarized by the intervenor as follows:
1. The Court's analysis
of the purposes underlying s.
35(1),
all treaties, s. 35 itself, the NRTA and
other statutory
and constitutional provisions
protecting
the interests of Aboriginal peoples must
be given
a generous and liberal interpretation;
2. the nature of the relationship
between the Crown and
Aboriginal
peoples is one of fiduciary which means
that in
dealings between the government and
Aboriginal
people the honour of the Crown is at
stake;
3. where there is any doubt
or ambiguity it must be
resolved
in favour of Aboriginal peoples;
4. courts must be sensitive
to the Aboriginal
perspective
itself on the meaning of the rights at
stake;
and
5. Aboriginal rights cannot,
since 1982, be
extinguished
and can only be regulated or infringed
consistent
with the justificatory test laid out by
the Supreme
Court in Sparrow [[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075]
and subsequent
cases.
[34] Care must be taken, of course, when
considering the meaning of words in an historical document. Language
evolves over time and meanings change. Some words in common use
even a short time ago are no longer acceptable. "Half-breed" is such
a word, as is "Indian" in many contexts. On the other hand, today's
frequent use of the word "aboriginal" (including in sec. 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982) is an example of a word not often used a century ago. The
modern usage and meaning will not necessarily be determinative when
interpreting words in documents or statutes
from an earlier era.
[35] In determining the question of whether
Métis are "Indians" for the purposes of sec. 13 of the NRTA,
a truly purposive approach must be taken. To accomplish this task,
it is usually helpful to have evidence of the surrounding circumstances
- such as contemporaneous governmental records - in interpreting a constitutional
provision enacted many years ago. This is certainly such a case.
All parties provided the trial judge with substantial historical and
contextual evidence respecting events in and about the time of the creation
of Manitoba as a province and, to a lesser extent (regrettably), surrounding
the enactment of the NRTA in 1930. Without such evidence the barren
record before the court would have been deficient.