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Congress of Aboriginal Peoples

R. v. Blais

Between
Her Majesty the Queen,
(respondent),
and

Ernest Lionel Joseph Blais
(accused) (appellant)


The Proceedings Before This Court


[30]     At the very outset, it is important to record that there is no challenge by any counsel to the essential findings of fact made by the trial judge and confirmed by the
 summary conviction appeal judge.  Also of significance, as we consider the arguments made to this court, is that many of the most recent Supreme Court of Canada authorities dealing with claims of aboriginal rights - principally Adams, Van der Peet,
 and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 - were either not available at trial, or not argued before the courts below.

 Constitutional Principles

 [31]     Interpretation of a constitution is quite
 different from simply construing an ordinary statute.  As
 Dickson J., as he then was, noted in Hunter v. Southam Inc.,
 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (at p. 155):

      The task of expounding a constitution is crucially
      different from that of construing a statute. A statute
      defines present rights and obligations. It is easily
      enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by
      contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its
      function is to provide a continuing framework for the
      legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when
      joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
      unremitting protection of individual rights and
      liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be
      repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of
      growth and development over time to meet new social,
      political and historical realities often unimagined by
      its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the
      constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions,
      bear these considerations in mind.

 [32] The Constitution should be interpreted "in a large, liberal and comprehensive spirit." See St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.).
 [http://library.usask.ca/native/cnlc/vol02/541.html]
 As noted in Re Section 24 of the B.N.A. Act (Edwards v. The Attorney General of Canada), [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.):
 "The B.N.A. Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits" (at pp. 106-107).

 [33] Furthermore, the analysis of aboriginal rights must take place within the constitutional framework established by the Supreme Court.  These decisions set forth the general principles to be applied when considering the relationships between the Crown and aboriginal peoples, which are helpfully summarized by the intervenor as follows:

      1.   The Court's analysis of the purposes underlying s.
           35(1), all treaties, s. 35 itself, the NRTA and
           other statutory and constitutional provisions
           protecting the interests of Aboriginal peoples must
           be given a generous and liberal interpretation;

      2.   the nature of the relationship between the Crown and
           Aboriginal peoples is one of fiduciary which means
           that in dealings between the government and
           Aboriginal people the honour of the Crown is at
           stake;

      3.   where there is any doubt or ambiguity it must be
           resolved in favour of Aboriginal peoples;

      4.   courts must be sensitive to the Aboriginal
           perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at
           stake; and

      5.   Aboriginal rights cannot, since 1982, be
           extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed
           consistent with the justificatory test laid out by
           the Supreme Court in Sparrow [[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075]
           and subsequent cases.

 [34]     Care must be taken, of course, when considering the meaning of words in an historical document.  Language evolves over time and meanings change.  Some words in common use even a short time ago are no longer acceptable. "Half-breed" is such a word, as is "Indian" in many contexts. On the other hand, today's frequent use of the word "aboriginal" (including in sec. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982) is an example of a word not often used a century ago. The modern usage and meaning will not necessarily be determinative when interpreting words in documents or statutes
 from an earlier era.

 [35]     In determining the question of whether Métis are "Indians" for the purposes of sec. 13 of the NRTA, a truly purposive approach must be taken.  To accomplish this task, it is usually helpful to have evidence of the surrounding circumstances - such as contemporaneous governmental records - in interpreting a constitutional provision enacted many years ago.  This is certainly such a case. All parties provided the trial judge with substantial historical and contextual evidence respecting events in and about the time of the creation of Manitoba as a province and, to a lesser extent (regrettably), surrounding the enactment of the NRTA in 1930. Without such evidence the barren record before the court would have been deficient.

 
Table of Contents
Introduction The Judgment Below
Decision of the Court of Queen's Bench Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge The Proceedings Before This Court
 Issues The Trial Judge's Findings
DifferencDifferences Between Title and Hunting Rights
Section 13 of the NRTA
Conclusions
New Evidence
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